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1 Introduction
Nitrogen leaching is a major environmental concern, with consequences on water nitrate
concentrations and on nitrous oxide emissions. The introduction of cover crops during the
inter-cropping season has been advocated as one means of reducing N leaching (Meisinger
et al., 1991). In the European Union, winter cover crops are mandatory in vulnerable zones
under the Nitrate Directive (Council of the European Communities, 1991). They may also
be part of agri-environmental schemes under which farmers are entitled to payments if they
adopt cover crops outside the Nitrate Directive vulnerable zones and/or if they commit
to manage the cover crop using a defined set of environmentally-friendlier practices. As
an illustration, in France, such payments amount to 86 and 48 C per hectare, respectively
(Ministe`re de l’Agriculture et de la Peˆche, 2007).
The positive impact of catch crops with respect to N leaching has been widely demon-
strated (Meisinger et al., 1991), especially before spring crops. They may also play an
important role before a winter crop such as winter wheat, which represents one quarter of
European cropland area and is characterized by low N uptake rate during the rainy sea-
son. Recent agronomic studies suggest that cover crops may also have a beneficial effect
with respect to the development of some plant pathogens. Enna¨ıfar et al. (2005) show
that summer fallow management affects the development of take-all root rot Gaeuman-
nomyces graminis tritici (Ggt), which poses a serious threat to wheat yield when wheat
follows another cereal crop. In particular, the introduction of a cover crop before wheat
may have a ’biofumigation’ effect that reduces take all disease severity (see also Enna¨ıfar
et al., 2005; Angus et al., 1994; Kirkegaard et al., 1994).
The adoption of a cover crop thus has consequences on the expected net returns and
net-return variance of the following crop (through the effect on take-all severity), as well
as on the environment (through the effect on N leaching). If those two effects are not
taken into account by farmers, private incentives alone are generally not sufficient to
prompt cover crop adoption before wheat because of increased costs and additional work
to do just after harvest. Moreover, the choice of a particular summer fallow management
results from a decision under uncertainty involving climate- and disease-related risks. In
this paper, we assess how the incentives to introduce a cover crop are modified when the
biofumigation effect on take-all and its interaction with N leaching risks are accounted for.
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There is a large body of literature addressing the issue of N leaching, both in economics
and in agronomy. Some studies have combined approaches from both disciplines. This is
the case in Lacroix et al. (2005). The authors use a biophysical model (STICS) and an
economic framework in which uncertainty is explicitly taken into account. They consider
cover crops as part of a set of measures to control N leaching. However, in their analysis,
the authors do not account for the possibility of diseases such as take all. Roberts et al.
(2004) estimate the effect of take-all severity and fertilization sources/timing on wheat
yield mean and variance. Using experimental data, they analyze the risk-return trade-offs
for risk averse farmers. In their study, the authors do not include the impact of summer
fallow management on disease severity.
To our knowledge, the trade-offs between N leaching and disease risk management in
the decision of adopting (or not) a cover crop before wheat has not been studied in the
economic literature. The novel aspect of our paper is to address this question by combin-
ing results from a crop-soil model (STICS), an epidemiological model, and an economic
framework of choice under uncertainty. We focus on the second wheat in a wheat-wheat
succession. Maximum feasible wheat yield and N-leaching are derived from STICS sim-
ulations. STICS is parameterized using soil and climate data from Grignon, located in
the main wheat growing area in France, and pertaining to years 1978-2007. Eight man-
agement practices (four summer fallow management, including two types of cover crop,
times two levels of input intensity) are simulated. The epidemiological model is based
on Enna¨ıfar et al. (2007) from which we infer the yield loss associated to various disease
ratings and choices of summer fallow management options. The simulated distributions of
climate-related impacts on yield and take-all severity are then introduced in an economic
model that determines the optimal management system on the basis of expected utility.
Equipped with this framework, we examine the optimal management choice of a risk
averse farmer. We compare the situations when the yield loss risk due to take-all is
taken into account and when it is not. We analyze the impact of price instruments aimed
at combating N leaching and discuss the minimum payment needed for cover crop to
be profitable in each case. This payment includes the differences in costs and revenues
associated with each management system, as well as the relative risk premium associated
to each management system. Last, we examine the robustness of our results with respect
to a wide range of values of input parameters using a Monte Carlo sensitivity analysis.
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The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the economic model
underlying the choice of summer fallow management for a (risk-averse) farmer producing
wheat. In Section 3, we describe the data used in the calibration of the biophysical,
epidemiological and economic models. Optimal managements with and without taking
into account the take-all disease risk are presented in Section 4. We also examine the
impact of various economic instruments on farmer’s optimal choice. Section 5 presents the
results of the Monte Carlo sensitivity analysis. We discuss in particular the distribution of
the minimum payment needed to trigger the adoption of each summer fallow management
(including cover crops) for a wide range of input parameters values. Section 6 concludes.
2 A model of cover-crop adoption under climate and
take-all risks
We consider a (risk-averse) farmer who produces wheat and has to choose among various
input intensities (indexed by i) and summer fallow managements (SFM, indexed by k).
Two types of risks potentially affect wheat yield: a climate risk (denoted by ˜c) and a
take-all risk (˜d). We denote by Fc and Fd the cumulative distribution probabilities of
the climate and the take-all risks. Agronomic evidence suggest that those two risks are
independent.
For a given type of SFM and a given level of input use intensity, the realisation of the
climate risk determines a maximum feasible yield Ymax(˜c, k, i), which is defined as the
maximum agronomic yield for the management system (k, i) without taking into account
the impact of the take-all disease. We denote by φ(˜c, ˜d, k, i) the share of yield that is lost
due to the take-all disease. This share depends upon the type of climate year realized.
The realized wheat yield is:
Y (˜c, ˜d, k, i) = Ymax(˜c, k, i)
(
1− φ(˜c, ˜d, k, i)
)
(1)
We denote by c(k, i) the per hectare cost of production as a function of the SFM and
the level of input intensity. As we shall examine policy instruments on fertilizer use, we
distinguish between fertilizer costs and other costs :
c(k, i) = wx(i) + cSFM(k) + c0(k, i) (2)
where x(i) denotes the per-hectare nitrogen use, w is the unit nitrogen fertilizer price,
cSFM(k) are SFM-specific costs, and c0(k, i) denotes all other costs. Absent any public
4
regulation, the profit of the farmer is thus:
Π(˜c, ˜d, k, i) = a
[
pY (˜c, ˜d, k, i)− c(k, i)
]
(3)
where p represents the price of wheat received by the farmer1 and a the wheat area.
We assume that the farmer’s attitude toward risk can be fully characterized by a utility
function U(.) with U ′(.) > 0 and U ′′(.) < 0. CRRA and CARA utility functions have been
commonly used in the literature examining expected utility based decisions. However,
these assumptions are somewhat restrictive with respect to the slope of absolute and
relative risk aversion measures. In this paper, we retain a hyperbolic absolute risk aversion
(HARA) function, which provides a more general functional form of utility function (see
Merton, 1971):
U(Π) =
1− γ
γ
(
βΠ
1− γ + η
)γ
(4)
where β, η, and γ are parameters subject to the restrictions γ 6= 1, β > 0, and η = 1 if
γ = −∞. The measure of absolute risk aversion (λ) is locally given by:
λ(Π) =
(
Π
1− γ +
1
β
)−1
(5)
The slopes of the absolute and relative risk aversion measures for this functional form can
be made positive or negative with appropriately selected values for the three parameters.
Equation (4) reduces to a CRRA functional form when the parameter η is equal to 0 ;
as the parameter γ goes to infinity, the utility function is asymptotically identical to a
CARA form.
The problem of the farmer is then to select the combination of SFM and input use
intensity that maximizes his/her expected utility of profit. The optimal combination
(k∗, i∗) is thus defined by:
(k∗, i∗) ∈ arg max
k∈{BS,WV,EM,LM},i∈{C,L}
{
EU (Π(˜c, ˜d, k, i))
}
(6)
where E denotes the expectation operator over the joint distribution of climate and take-
all risks.
1Note here that wheat price is assumed to be certain and known to the farmer. A simple extension of
the model would be to explicitly include a price risk, by treating the wheat price as a stochastic component
in the farmer’s program. This, however, would blur the trade-off between take-all and N-leaching that we
focus on in this paper. The sensitivity analysis conducted in Section 5 provides some static comparative
results with respect to the effect of output price.
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The optimal choice depends on the farmer’s risk preferences, climate and the take-all
risks, production costs and wheat price. Notice that if the farmer does not internalize
the impact of his/her production choices on the take-all risk, the solution of the farmer’s
decision problem is simply obtained by replacing Y (˜c, ˜d, k, i) by the maximum feasible
yield, Ymax(˜c, k, i), in equation (3).
The solution of (6) corresponds to a situation in which no policy instrument is in place.
In particular, the social cost of N-leaching is not internalized by the farmer. As we shall
consider policy instruments later on in the paper, we introduce a regulated version of the
farmer’s program (6):
(kˆ, iˆ) ∈ arg max
k∈{BS,WV,EM,LM},i∈{C,L}
{
EU (Π(˜c, ˜d, k, i) +G)
}
(7)
where G denotes the level of public intervention and can be positive (subsidy) or negative
(tax). We shall examine three policy instruments in Section 4 and 5.
The first instrument we examine is a tax on N leaching. We denote by n(˜c, ˜d, k, i) the
level of per hectare N leaching. N leaching depends on the farmer’s management choices
(fertiliser use and SFM), take all (a high prevalence of the take-all disease implies a lower
N uptake by wheat), and climate realization (in particular autumn and winter rain). The
introduction of a standard Pigovian tax τ implies that G = −τ(an(˜c, ˜d, k, i)).
Second, we consider a tax t on fertilizer use. The rationale for adopting such an input-
based instrument is that it might be difficult in practice for the regulator to compute the
effective level of N leaching and that fertilizer use is less costly to observe. This indirect
instrument would translate into (7) by G = −t(ax(i)). Notice that, in our framework,
taxing the quantity of fertilizer is equivalent to taxing the conventional use of input
(relative to the low input use case) since nitrogen quantities differ across input intensity
levels but not across SFM types. Compared to the case of a Pigovian tax on N leaching,
taxation of nitrogen induces an efficiency loss since for the same quantity of nitrogen x(i),
the level of N-leaching varies across SFM types.
The last instrument we consider is a direct payment G = as(k, i) to each combination
of SFM and input use (a tax if s(k, i) < 0). Compared to the use of a Pigovian tax, the
loss of efficiency is due to the fact that N-leaching for EM or LM varies according to input
intensity (conventional or low nitrogen use).
6
In Sections 4 and 5, we shall also determine the minimum per hectare payment re-
quired for a particular management system to emerge in the optimum. Formally, we shall
compute s(k, i) such that:
EU
(
Π(˜c, ˜d, k, i) +G+ as(k, i)
)
= EU(Π(˜c, ˜d, kˆ, iˆ) +G
)
for all (k, i) (8)
where (kˆ, iˆ) is the optimum combination resulting from program (7).
3 An empirical application to France
In this section, we present the data and models used to represent the conditions of a
typical wheat-producing farm in Grignon (48o50’N; 1o57’E). Grignon is located in the
Paris Basin, the main French wheat growing area.
3.1 Summer fallow and input use management
Summer fallow (SF) management Input intensity (k, i)
Bare soil conventional (BS,C)
Bare soil low input (BS,L)
Wheat volunteers conventional (WV,C)
Wheat volunteers low input (WV,L)
Early mustard destruction conventional (EM,C)
Early mustard destruction low input (EM,L)
Late mustard destruction conventional (LM,C)
Late mustard destruction low input (LM,L)
Table 1: Farmer’s summer fallow management and input intensity choices
Four types of SFM are considered (k ∈ {BS, WV, LM, EM}). They vary according
to the type of soil tillage, the sowing date, and the nature of the cover crop (see Table 1).
The first type of SFM is bare soil (BS) from harvest of preceding wheat to sowing of the
following wheat. The second option available to the farmer is to allow wheat volunteers
(WV) from harvest of preceding wheat to sowing of the following wheat. With WV, soil
is not tilled until the next wheat sowing. The third and fourth types of SFM correspond
to the introduction of a catch crop, namely white mustard. To account for the influence
of the length of the mustard growth cycle on N leaching, we further distinguish between
two options, whether the wheat sowing date (i) is the same as in the two previous cases
and catch crop destruction occurs just before this date (early mustard destruction, EM),
or (ii) is delayed, thus permitting a later destruction of the mustard (LM).
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In addition, the farmer may opt for conventional or low input use (i = {C, L}). The
conventional (C) and low input (L) practices differ according to wheat yield targets that
define fertilizer use, sowing density, and chemical protection. The conventional crop man-
agement is defined according to a 10 t.ha−1 yield target, which imposes a high sowing
density (275 grains.m−2), high levels of N fertilization to meet high nitrogen requirements
(300 kgN.ha−1), and high chemical protection. The low-input is defined for a medium yield
target (7.5 t.ha−1), involving a 60% lower sowing density than under conventional manage-
ment, nitrogen requirements of 225 kgN.ha−1 and less chemical protection. Fertilization
is calculated using the N balance at the end of winter and is based on N requirements,
mineralized N, final soil residual nitrogen objective at harvest of 40 kgN.ha−1 (Goulevant
et al., 2008).
Table 2 synthesizes the assumptions regarding summer fallow and wheat management
retained in the simulations. A detailed discussion of the underlying assumptions from an
agronomic standpoint can be found in Goulevant et al. (2008).
3.2 Maximum yields
The maximum feasible wheat yield, Ymax(˜c, k, i) is obtained from STICS simulations.
STICS is a generic crop-soil model simulating the crop growth from sowing to harvest at
a daily time scale (Brisson et al., 1998). It is based on biomass accumulation and radiation
use efficiency concepts. Given input parameters defining climate, soil, cultivar, and crop
management, STICS calculates the quantity and quality of harvested grains, drainage and
nitrate leaching, and outputs related to the evolution of the soil characteristics under the
influence of the crop. STICS has been validated and parameterized for various crops and
a wide range of pedo-climatic conditions2. Parameterizations of STICS for white mustard
(growth, N mineralization from decomposition of residues) are available and have been
validated under field conditions (Dorsainvil, 2002; Justes and Mary, 2004; Justes et al.,
2004).
The pedo-climatic parameters used in the simulations pertain to a deep and silty
soil, with 190 mm of plant-available water. The simulations were initialized with soil
residual nitrogen at harvest of the preceding crop of 40 kg ha−1. The preceding crop for
all simulations is winter wheat. The climate database includes the daily minimum and
2More information on the STICS model can be found at www.avignon.inra.fr/stics/.
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Table 2: Description of summer fallow and wheat management options.
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maximum temperatures, rainfall, global radiation, and potential evapotranspiration for
thirty years from 1978 to 2007. The average temperature calculated during the whole year
is 11oC, annual global radiation is 4117 MJ.m−2, annual rainfall is 605 mm, and annual
evapotranspiration is 725 mm.
The maximal feasible yield at harvest is simulated for each year by STICS. Simulations
have been run over thirty years (1978-2007) for each combination of SFM and input inten-
sity. Summary statistics of Ymax(˜c, k, i) are presented in Table 3. Absent any impact of
take-all, the highest average yield is obtained with conventional input use and a bare soil
during summer. This management option is also characterized by the lowest variability
among conventional input use systems. In accordance with the above discussed assump-
tion governing the level of N fertilization, input intensity has a significant impact on wheat
yield, with low input systems leading to 26% lower yields on average than conventional
ones.
Mean Std dev. Max Min
BS C 9.10 1.56 11.10 5.09
L 7.13 1.11 8.47 4.42
WV C 9.00 1.73 11.19 4.32
L 7.12 1.22 8.50 3.86
EM C 8.98 1.76 11.22 4.19
L 7.01 1.25 8.54 3.63
LM C 8.94 1.87 11.33 4.19
L 7.10 1.31 8.52 3.71
Table 3: Wheat yields (in t.ha−1) from STICS Simulations 1978-2007
3.3 Economic parameters
Unit costs associated with the eight management options are given in Table 4. These costs
include fixed and variable costs associated with summer fallow managements, fertilization,
and other field operations (sowing, chemical protection) described in Table 2.
Fertilizer cost is based on a fertilizer price assumption of 1 C.kg−1 and on quantities
corresponding to the respective yield target of conventional and low input systems. The
unit cost of production ranges from 369 C.ha−1 for WV with low level of input intensity
to 737 C.ha−1 in the case of EM with a conventional level of input. The cost advantage
of WV is mainly due to the absence of costs during the summer fallow period. Therefore,
it allows savings compared to BS, which requires three stubble ploughing during summer.
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Unit costs(∗) N-fertilizer costs (∗∗) SF management Other costs
(c) (wx) (cSF) (c0)
k i Mean Min Max
(C.ha−1) (C.ha−1) (C.ha−1) (C.ha−1)
BS C 728 198 170 220 60 470
L 435 123 95 145 60 252
WV C 656 201 180 210 - 455
L 369 126 100 135 - 243
EM C 737 211 200 225 71 455
L 451 137 125 150 71 243
LM C 671 214 195 225 71 386
L 453 139 115 150 71 243
(∗) Using average quantity of fertilizer use. (∗∗) Based on a fertilizer price of 1 C.kgN−1 (see text).
Table 4: Costs of production
The cost of a mustard cover crop includes one stubble ploughing in August, the sowing of
the cover crop and the destruction of the cover crop (in mid October and mid-november
for EM and LM, respectively). The SFM choice induces some minor differences in the
other production costs. The late mustard cover crop implies lower production costs in
C management due to the assumption of late sowing excluding the need for chemicals
during implantation.
The wheat price effectively paid to farmers (p, in C.t−1) varies according to the protein
content (rp, in percent). Based on the information provided by a large grain cooperative
in the area of study (2008), we use a price scheme, whereby a high (low) protein content
triggers a premium (penalty) relative to some reference price (pi):
p =

pi − 5 if rp < 10%
pi − 2(11− rp) if 10% ≤ rp ≤ 11%
pi + 2(rp − 11.5) if 11.5% ≤ rp ≤ 12.5%
pi + 2 if rp > 12%
(9)
rp is calculated by STICS and depends on climatic conditions and the wheat crop
management. In the base simulations (see Section 4), pi is set to 200 C.t
−1 and wheat
area is set to one hectare (a = 1). These assumptions will be relaxed in the sensitivity
analysis presented in Section 5.
In the base simulations, we set the parameters defining the farmer’s utility function
to satisfy the usual properties of farmer’s risk preferences, including decreasing absolute
and relative risk aversion (see Chavas and Holt, 1996). γ, β and η are set to -3, 0.1, and
1, respectively. For a total profit equal to 5,000C, the levels of absolute and relative risk
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aversion are respectively 0.08 and 0.49 which is compatible with a moderately risk-averse
farmer. In Section 5, a wider range of these values will be explored.
3.4 Take-all incidence and yield loss
Enna¨ıfar et al. (2007) have developed several models to predict the incidence of take-
all disease on winter wheat as a function of crop management, soil characteristics, and
climate. The models have been built and validated on a large database, which includes
data on the area of study. It has been shown that the use a disease measurement at a
very early stage of the plant cycle greatly improves the prediction of the models. In our
simulations, we chose StatL1+ , an additive static model with one of the best predictive
value (Enna¨ıfar et al., 2007).
This disease score (Fsem30) is the percentage of plants with diseased seminal roots at
the leaf shealth erect stage of the crop cycle (GS30). From this score, the epidemiological
model predicts the percentage of wheat yield loss.
Other variables of the epidemiological model include climatic variables, soil texture,
field crop history (two preceding crops and tillage management), sowing density, amount
of ammonium in nitrogen fertilization applications.
Enna¨ıfar et al. (2005) have showed that the type of the cover crop has a strong influence
on the Fsem30 value of the following wheat. Following Enna¨ıfar et al. (2005), the range of
expected Fsem30 values for each are set to (0, 20, 40) for BS, (20, 35, 50) for LM, (40, 55,
70) for EM, and (70, 85, 100) for WV. In the base simulations, the two extreme realizations
of the FSem30 ranges are assigned the same probability (1/6), whereas the central value
is assigned a probability of 2/3. The climatic parameters are drawn randomly among the
set of climatic years. Each year is assigned the same probability.
The take-all related yield loss φ(˜c, ˜d, k, i) is calculated for each year, each SFM, each
level of input intensity, and each value of Fsem30. Summary statistics of the resulting
values are provided in Table 5.
As expected, the lowest reduction in wheat yield obtained under BS management,
whereas WV is the most vulnerable SFM. The introduction of catch crop (either EM or
LM) lead to intermediate performances in term of wheat yield.
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Mean Std dev. Max Min
BS C 7.96 6.17 22.71 0.00
L 7.68 6.05 22.27 0.00
WV C 35.50 6.21 46.11 20.94
L 35.15 6.28 45.93 20.50
EM C 21.50 7.09 36.03 7.45
L 21.06 7.07 35.65 7.14
LM C 15.10 6.38 28.75 4.16
L 13.66 6.21 27.07 3.11
Table 5: Yield loss (in %) due to the take-all disease Simulations 1978-2007 for the three
level of FSEM30 per summer fallow × crop management
3.5 N-leaching estimations and its implementation in the eco-
nomic model
N leaching is obtained by combining simulations both from the agronomic and the epi-
demiological model. N-leaching depends on the amount of soil mineral nitrogen during the
period of high rainfall and low vegetation growth (autumn and winter). Two components
play a role in N leaching: (i) initial soil residual nitrogen after the harvest of the preceding
crop, and (ii) N uptake during and after the inter cropping season. The introduction of a
cover crop tends to increase N uptake. Wheat management (in particular N-fertilization),
climatic conditions and take-all disease severity have an impact on N-uptake and on final
soil residual nitrogen, which in turn may result in N-leaching the following year. As our
approach is static, we have to take into account the variations between initial and final
residual nitrogen in the soil, which represents a potential N-leaching. To this effect, we
distinguish between two components in total N-leaching:
n(˜c, ˜d, k, i) = nL(˜c, k, i) + b(k) (HRN(˜c, ˜d, k, i)− HRNinit) (10)
In Equation (10), nL(˜c, k, i) represents the ’direct’ (per hectare) N-leaching, which
depends only on the initial soil nitrogen after the preceding wheat harvest and on the
cover crop management3. nL is obtained from STICS simulations results. HRNinit is the
initial soil residual nitrogen at harvest, assumed to be 40 kg.ha−1. HRN(˜c, ˜d, k, i) is the
soil residual nitrogen. It accounts for the quantity of nitrogen that has not been absorbed
because of the disease. We use the same assumptions as Goulevant et al. (2008) with
regard to the share of this quantity of nitrogen that remains in soil. Last, b(k) is the
3This component may also depend, albeit to a very limited extent, on wheat management because of
minor differences in implantation techniques between management systems.
13
SFM-specific N-leaching effect of the residual nitrogen in soil. It is obtained from an
estimation of the relationship between the N-leaching and the soil residual nitrogen at
harvest, through simulations using STICS over thirty years under different soil residual
nitrogen levels and for the different cover crop managements (Goulevant et al., 2008).
Mean Std dev. Max Min
BS C 8.183 13.730 49.930 -5.520
L 8.175 14.147 51.310 -5.290
WV C 6.841 11.221 36.200 -5.200
L 6.607 11.558 37.800 -5.200
EM C 5.538 9.085 32.920 -4.420
L 5.661 9.522 34.600 -4.420
LM C 5.741 9.226 27.740 -5.520
L 5.801 9.571 27.555 -5.290
Table 6: Total N-leaching (in kg ha−1) from STICS simulations 1978-2007 including the
impact of take-all disease
The effective N-leaching by SFMs and by level of input intensity are given in Table 6.
As expected, using a white mustard as a catch crop results in the lowest average N-
leaching. White mustard has been proved to reduce leaching by a fast growth rate and a
high N-uptake (Atallah and Lopez-Real, 1991). This is reinforced by its impact on take-all
disease (Angus et al., 1994; Enna¨ıfar et al., 2005). Conversely, ’bare soil’ is the worst SFM
in terms of N-leaching. With a BS soil tillage simply consists in some stubble ploughings
during the summer period, at given depth. As a result, the risk of N-leaching from harvest
of the preceding wheat to sowing is high. Yet, as shown by Enna¨ıfar et al. (2007), BS
significantly reduces the risk of take-all. Wheat volunteers systems play a role in reducing
nitrate leaching (see also Macdonald et al., 2005). However, such systems increase take-all
incidence and severity on the following wheat crop (Enna¨ıfar et al., 2005).
4 Results
The base scenario assumptions regarding input parameters discussed in Section 3 are
summarized in Table 7 (column ’Base’). Wheat and fertilizer prices correspond to observed
levels in 2007. The distribution of the probability of occurrence of one particular Fsem30
value (out of three) plays a key role in the assessment of the impact of take-all risks.
In absence of sufficient experimental evidence, we assume that the central value of the
range given by Enna¨ıfar et al. (2007) for each management system is associated with a
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Assumptions
Base Sensitivity analysis
Economic parameters
Wheat price (pi) 200 C.t−1 [90; 290] (Uniform)
Area (a) 1 ha [1; 50] (Uniform)
Fertilizer price (w) 1 C.kgN−1 [0.5; 4] (Uniform)
N-leaching tax (τ) 0 C.kgN−1 [0; 4.5] (Uniform)
Utility function
β -0.1 [0.1; 2] (Uniform)
η 1 [5; 10] (Uniform)
γ -3 [−3;−1] (Uniform)
Range of FSem30
(f1, f2, f3) BS: (0, 20, 40); WV: (70, 85, 100); EM: (40, 55, 70); LM: (15, 30, 45)
Probability of each FSem30 ∗
(P1, P2, P3) (1/6, 2/3, 1/6) P1 ∈ [0; 1/3], P1 = P3, P2 = 1− P1 − P3 (Uniform)
∗ Pi denotes the probability of Fsem30 being equal to fi.
Table 7: Input parameters: Assumptions in the base scenario and in the Monte Carlo
sensitivity analysis
probability P2 = 2/3 and that the probabilities that the two extreme values occur are
equal to P1 = P3 = 1/6.
Economic indicators for each of the eight management systems examined under the
base asumptions are presented in Table 8. We first consider the situation in which the
risk of a take-all outbreak is not taken into account by the farmer. The impact of take-
all on yield (φ(˜c, ˜d, k, i)) is thus set to 0 for all management systems. It follows that
Y (˜c, ˜d, k, i) is assumed to be equal to Ymax(˜c, k, i) for all (k, i) in this case; the only
remaining risk faced by the farmer therefore results from climate variability. Columns 3
to 5 in Table 8 present the corresponding results in terms of expected utility and mean
and variance of profit. Columns 7 to 9 refer to the case where the farmer’s optimization
program includes the take-all effect φ(˜c, ˜d, k, i). The latter is computed based on the
relationships given by Enna¨ıfar et al. (2007).
Under the base assumptions and when the risk of yield loss due to take-all is ignored
by the farmer, WV (wheat volunteers) combined with conventional input use yields the
highest expected utility. This system is associated with low costs and relatively high yield
(absent any take-all impact). However, this system is also the most vulnerable to the
development of the take-all disease. It is therefore not chosen when take-all related yield
loss is accounted for. In the latter case, the optimal summer fallow management consists
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Without take-all risk With take-all risk
k i EU(Π) E(Π) V (Π) s EU(Π) E(Π) V (Π) s
(kC.ha−1) (kC.ha−1) (kC.ha−1) (kC.ha−1)
BS C -1.233 1.066 7.642 0.051 -1.245 0.930 7.238 .
L -1.241 0.968 3.926 0.147 -1.251 0.866 3.738 0.063
WV C -1.228 1.118 9.460 . -1.286 0.483 4.717 0.445
L -1.236 1.029 4.731 0.086 -1.281 0.534 2.441 0.394
EM C -1.236 1.030 9.761 0.088 -1.271 0.649 6.975 0.281
L -1.245 0.928 4.968 0.187 -1.272 0.636 3.606 0.291
LM C -1.230 1.095 10.938 0.024 -1.254 0.828 8.732 0.102
L -1.243 0.945 5.345 0.170 -1.261 0.755 4.513 0.173
Table 8: Expected utility, expected profit, variance of profit, and minimum subsidy under
base assumptions with (right) and without (left) taking into account take-all risk. The
highest expected utility in each case is indicated in bold.
of bare soil from harvest of the preceding crop to sowing. In both cases, conventional
input use is preferred.
Obviously, our assumptions regarding the parameters of the utility function matter
in the ranking of management systems. The base combination of assumptions for β, γ,
and η leads to a quite moderate risk-aversion. As an illustration, regardless of the role of
take-all on yields, the preferred management system pertains here to the highest expected
profit, as well as a relatively high level of variance.
In order to compare management systems yielding profits that differ in both expected
levels and variability, we compute the minimum payment s for each management system
such that it emerges in the optimum. s is thus the solution of Equation (6) and embeds
not only the differences in profitability, but also the risk premium differential. The results
without and with take-all risk are presented in columns 6 and 10 of Table 8, respectively.
Absent any yield loss due to take-all, s ranges from 24 to 187 C.ha−1. (By (8), the
minimum subsidy for the optimal system (kˆ, iˆ) under the base assumptions is zero). The
implementation of a mustard combined with late crushing, late sowing of wheat, and
combined with conventional management (LM,C) requires a payment of only 24 C.ha−1
to secure the same expected utility as (WV,C). This low level of s can be explained
by the cost advantage of (LM,C) that compensates low yields and a high variance of
profit. At the other end of the spectrum, early mustard (EM) combined with low input
use requires the highest payment to match the expected utility associated with (WV,C).
Whatever the type of SFM, low-input management systems require higher payments than
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conventional management, reflecting the absence of incentives to internalize environmental
externalities.
When accounted for, the risk of a take-all outbreak greatly modifies the ranking of
management systems based on expected utility. This changes explained by the change
in both absolute levels of profit and probability distribution. From the results presented
in Table 8, one can note that the choice of SFM matters more than input management
in this ranking. As WV-based systems are the most vulnerable to take-all risk, the
payment needed for these systems to yield the same expected utility as (BS, C) is markedly
higher than without take-all risk. It reaches 394 and 445 C.ha−1 in the case of low
and conventional input use, respectively. Interestingly, low-input management requires a
smaller payment than conventional management when combined with wheat volunteers.
This is due to a lower variance of yields in this case.
As it lowers the farmer’s exposure to take-all risks, bare soil-based systems plays the
role of an insurance and clearly outperforms all other SFM systems. Even combined
with low input use, ’bare soil’ yields higher expected utility than any other management
system. For all other SFM, the payment needed to match BS expected utility is greater
than in the case without take-all risk. At least 102 C.ha−1 are needed for a catch crop
to emerge in the optimum. Such a level of subsidy would allow a late crushing mustard
combined with conventional input management to break even with (BS,C). Again, this
reflects a cost advantage of LM over EM that offsets the yields differential. An additional
payment of 71 C.ha−1 is needed for farmers to adopt LM in combination with low-input
management systems.
As SFM and input management systems have contrasted impacts on the environment,
we examine how farmers’ optimal choice might be affected by policy instruments. We first
introduce a tax on N-leaching. We assume that N-leaching can be observed and computed
using equation (10). The examined tax varies from 0 to 4.5 C.kgN−1 by steps of 0.5C.
The corresponding results are presented in Figures 1.a and 1.b. Again, we distinguish
between whether take-all risks are accounted for (right) or not (left) by the farmer.
Even for high levels of the tax on N-leaching, the ranking of SFM and input manage-
ment systems is not modified. This suggests that the differences in N-leaching are not
sufficiently large to offset differences in cost and yield differential. Of course, the profit
is reduced by the introduction of the tax. But the ranking of expected utilities is not
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a. Without take-all risk b. With take-all risk
Figure 1: Impact of an N-Leaching tax on expected utility
modified to the extent that it triggers a change in optimal management under the base
assumptions.
The picture is different when a tax on fertilizer use is introduced. Figures 2.a and
2.b present the results (without and with take-all risk, respectively) for a tax on fertilizer
ranging from 0 to 2.25 C.kgN−1. Practices that rely on conventional wheat manage-
ment are relatively more penalized by such a tax. The relative profitability of low-input
management systems therefore increases with respect to the fertilizer tax. For a given
SFM, the tax triggers a switch from conventional to low-input systems for levels of the
tax above 0.75 C.kgN−1. Two exceptions are however noteworthy when take-all risks
are taken into account: WV, for which low-input management dominates conventional
management without any tax on fertilizer, and EM, for which a small tax is sufficient for
low-input systems to yield a higher expected utility than conventional management.
Nevertheless, the introduction of a fertilizer tax does not modify the optimal choice of
summer fallow management. The latter is robust to relatively large changes in N-input
prices. Under our base assumptions and whatever the level of the tax, WV yields the
highest levels expected utility when yield losses due to take-all are not taken into account,
and BS remains preferable when this risk is accounted for by the farmer. The only change
triggered by the fertilizer tax is a switch from conventional to low-input systems. This
occurs for a tax in the neighborhood of 1.25 and 0.75 C.kgN−1 for WV (without take-all)
and BS (with take-all), respectively.
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a. Without take-all risk b. With take-all risk
Figure 2: Impact of a tax on N fertilizer on expected utility
5 Sensitivity analysis
In order to assess the robustness of the SFM choices, we conduct a sensitivity analysis.
As experimental data are not sufficient to set the input parameters based on observed
ranges for all the relevant parameters, we rely on Monte Carlo simulations.
Three main categories of input parameters are examined: economic parameters, the
probability of occurrence of extreme realisations of Fsem30, and the farmer’s attitude to-
ward risk as summarized by the parameters defining the utility function (see equation (4)).
The ranges and distribution used in the Monte Carlo sensitivity analysis are summarized
in the last column of Table 7.
The wheat price range (before adjustment for protein content) is set slightly wider
than the maximum spread in observed farm prices over the period 2000-2007. The range
assumed for fertilizer price is also admittedly wide compared to historic and current
prices. This assumption has been made in order to accommodate for the possibility of a
fertilizer tax, the introduction of which is formally equivalent to an increase of the nitrogen
price in the model. In addition, we consider the possibility of a tax on N-leaching. The
combination of a tax on N-leaching and potentially high nitrogen price tends to favor the
adoption of low input management systems in comparison to the base simulations. Total
farm-level wheat area was normalized to unity in the base scenario. It is now allowed to
vary from 1 to 50 ha to account for the impact of wealth on the farmer’s risk aversion.
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The probability that a particular value of Fsem30 occurs (out of three possible out-
comes for each SFM) affects the expected utility through its impact on wheat yield. We
relax the assumption about the distribution made in the base scenario. However, we
maintain that the central value of Fsem30 provided by plant pathologists remains the
mode (P2 ≥ 13). Furthermore, we assume that the two extreme outcomes of FSem30 are
equiprobable (P1 = P3). The corresponding probabilitues are randomly drawn from [0;
1
3
].
The parameters defining U(.) are randomly drawn, and chosen such that the conditions
implied by the HARA functional forms are fulfilled. Instead of imposing a priori restric-
tions on the values of β, η, and γ, we draw these values from independent distributions
and retain only the combinations that ensure that U(.) is defined with the appropriate
properties.
The set of input parameters is constructed by iteratively and independently drawing
their values from uniform distributions, which ranges are given in Table 7. 10,000 sets
of parameters are contructed. 8,180 are kept after discarding the combinations that do
not fulfill the conditions given in Section 2. The simulations are replicated with two sets
of parameters. In both sets, the parameters have the same values except for the take-all
related yield loss and its impact on N-leaching, which is set either to 0 (“without take
all”) or computed by the take-all model (“with take-all”).
The results confirms the advantage of wheat-volunteers (WV) when the take-all risk is
ignored. This SFM yields the highest expected utility in a vast majority of the simulations
(95%, 69% combined with low input and 26% combined with conventional management).
In the remaining 5%, BS emerges as the optimal SFM in almost all the cases combined
with a conventional input management system. When the probability of yield loss due
to take-all is accounted for, the dominance of BS is also confirmed. Over the whole set
of conducted simulations, this SFM is the only one that emerges in the optimum. It is
combined with low input management in 69% of the simulations.
Figures 3.a and 3.b summarize the distribution of the minimal subsidy needed for
each management system to yield the maximal expected utility (see also Figures 4 and
5 in appendix). For all management systems but BS, the distribution of the minimum
subsidy is shifted upward in the “with take-all” case relatively to the “without take-all”.
This indicates that the relative efficiency of BS in terms of preserving the crop from a
disease outbreak is large compared to the effect on leaching of alternative management
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a. Without take-all risk b. With take-all risk
Figure 3: Monte Carlo sensitivity analysis: Summary of the distributions of s with (right)
or without (left) take-all risk
systems. The insurance effect of a bare soil between the harvest of the preceding crop
and the sowing of wheat clearly dominates other yield and cost considerations for a wide
range of parameter values.
On average, the adoption of mustard would require a minimum subsidy amounting to
127 C.ha−1 absent any risk of take-all, and 152 C.ha−1 if take-all risks are accounted for.
In both cases, these amounts would be sufficient (on average) for a mustard with a late
destruction date and low-input management to compete with the optimal management.
Interestingly, the minimum subsidy associated to this type of SFM is also characterized
by a relatively low variance in comparison to other SFM. It could thus be considered as
a potential candidate for a policy encouraging the adoption of catch crop in the area of
study.
6 Concluding remarks
The choice of the type of summer fallow management in between a wheat-wheat succession
involves trade-offs between (i) standard private interests as reflected in yields and costs,
(ii) environmental impacts on water quality through N-leaching, and (iii) risk management
of a disease outbreak potentially detrimental to the crop. In this paper, we have combined
results from economics, plant pathology, and agronomy to shed some light on this type of
situations.
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Without take-all risk With take-all risk
Mean Std dev. Min Max Mean Std dev. Min Max
(C.ha−1) (C.ha−1)
BS C 114 92 0 400 84 87 0 365
L 74 50 0 342 22 44 0 244
WV C 87 86 0 353 514 99 267 736
L 24 48 0 277 349 138 105 762
EM C 189 91 78 465 373 74 202 568
L 136 48 80 379 260 90 103 567
LM C 142 92 13 412 216 77 56 428
L 127 44 72 353 152 62 45 396
Table 9: Monte Carlo sensitivity analysis: Summary statistics of s with (right) or without
(left) take-all risk
The case study examined in this paper is illustrative of such trade-offs. If the risk of
disease is ignored by farmers, the type of summer fallow management favored by private
incentives alone (“wheat volunteers”, WV) is also the ’worst’ practice with respect to the
development of the disease, possibly leading to significant yield losses. At the same time,
the practice that yields the highest expected utility to farmers fully aware of the disease
risk (“bare soil”, BS) is also the ’worst’ with respect to its impact on water quality through
N-leaching.
Between those two management systems, adoption of a catch crop may appear as
an interesting alternative choice as it provides higher environmental benefits than BS
(through reduction of N leaching), as well as a lower exposure to take-all risk than WV
because of the ’biofumigation’ effect. The results of the simulations conducted in this
paper tend to confirm that private incentives alone are not sufficient to prompt farmers
to adopt mustard as a catch crop. However, the results also show that a standard price
instrument on N leaching might not be sufficient to trigger adoption either, even for high
tax levels compared to current nitrogen prices and even when take-all risks are fully taken
into account by farmers.
The main reason is that the beneficial effect of BS in preventing the development of
the disease provides a protection to the farmer against yield loss. This beneficial (pri-
vate) impact offsets the negative (and public) consequences on nitrogen leaching. Hence,
any incentive scheme meant to convince farmers to switch away from BS must therefore
compensate for the increase in risk, not only for increased costs and/or lower yields.
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From a public policy perspective, N leaching concern and/or take-all risk manage-
ment alone do not justify subsidies, in the context of our case study, to encourage catch
crop adoption within a wheat-wheat succession. Should such payments be implemented,
they should be motivated by the presence of other externalities (soil erosion, water man-
agement, preventing loss of soil organic matter). One finding of the paper is that the
minimum compensation required for farmers to implement a white mustard instead of
BS (when combined with some policy instruments affecting the nitrogen input price) lies
in a range that is comparable to existing CAP-related environmental payments. In this
case, the combination of a catch crop that is destroyed late in the season and a low-input
management may be chosen by risk-averse farmers and would provide some environmental
benefits (reduction of N leaching).
This work can be extended in several directions. The introduction of the possibility of
seed treatment in the economic framework is one. Another is to explicitly account for the
dynamic nature of the problem, both regarding the nitrogen cycle and crop rotation. This
would involve to endogenously determine, rather than impose, the post harvest residual
nitrogen and thus initial soil nitrogen for the following crop. This is left for further
research as it requires a full coupling of the economic and crop-soil models.
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